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REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (b.; MONTA1,A)

at
INDI ANA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, INDIANA,
Columbus Day,

Mo~day,

PENNSYLVA~A

October 11, 1971, 8:00 p . m.

FOREIGN RELATIONS IN TRANSITION

When the history of this century is written, it may
well be recorded that the whole international order shifted
and reorganized itself in a short span of time in the early
1970's.

For those of us who are living through today's changes_,

the accelerating transition is evident.

What cannot be f oreseen

is whether the shift leads, in the end, to a new era of confrontation or toward a new plateau of international stability.
How the die is cast depends heavily on the wisdom which we in
the United States bring to our understanding of our times.
That is why your inquiry here at Indiana University is so
timely and appropri ate .
Let me consider at the outset several manifestations
of t he current t ransition in the world and the responses to
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them in the nation's foreign policy. Tne most

~T.ediata ,

course, is the Pre kident 1 s new economic program.
years of over- extension has
bree.king point.

stre~ched

the

u. s,

of

Twenty-five
economy to the

To avoid a. financial collapse, tha Pro sijent

found it necessary to combine what amounts to de facto devaluation of the dollar plus a

blanke~

increase in import duties

with a domestic freeze of wages and prices.
Other countries have long been aware that something
had to give in the way the
nation's financial affairs.
they caused great

dist:-ess~

u. s .

govBrnment was msnaging the

When these moves came, however,
notably in Europe and

J~pan .

What

is feared abroad is not so much the moves themselves but what
they could por·cend.

At 6'Cake is their export m<J.rkets in the

United States and, hence , the possible evaporation of a great
thair
ueal of ;, . international purchasing

p0~er.

It is u..>1derstanda.hle, in the cir·cumste..nces that the
search for n€.,·1 economic alignments has inten::;ified .

The United

Kingdom is

moving~

for example, t()ward the

Eu:.~opea.n

Community, now, with the Bupport of France.
fact, the whole of Western Europe is

t~

Economic

Germany and, in

ding to\'Ia.rd closer

commercial relationships with Eastern Europe.

For its part,

the Soviet Union seems eager to facilitate thia shift and, is
actively seeking to promote it through politltal stabilization .
Thus, the Soviet governru.:!nt has acknowledged the legitimacy of
West Berlin as an appendage of West Germany and is pressing
for a wider

ag~eement

which would, in effect, legalize the

territorial changes which ware effected in Eastern Europe
after World War II, inclucing the division of

Germ~y.

The United States is acquiescing, in these new
trends in Europe) at a pace, however, which seems sometimes
as reluctant as it ia belated.

Uo

too, with regard to the Far East.

s.

policies are changing,

It seems to me, we are

learning, in paying the te:('rible price of Viet Nam, the folly
of extending ideological fears and great po\>ser animosities

- 4 into the inner conflicts of underdeveloped regions.
process of learning, the Vietname6e war has
meaning for this nation.

In the

~een d~ained

of

It is revealed, now, as a tragic

waste, a revelation that is reflected in the President's
program of phased troop withdrawals.

In that sense, the war

is over for this nation; regrettably, what has yet to be ended
is the military involvement.

There is left in Southeast Asia,

the vestiges o! mistakes of the past and they continue to
exact a toll of sensel8ss death snd devastation.

One way or

another--by the action of the President or the Congress and,
hopefully, by both- -these vestiges must be removed.
It may be that an end to the involvement will be
facilitated by changes in the Sino- U. S. relationship which
the President has been cultivating.

In any event, China seems

to be moving from a pha6e of isolation into one of more active
participation in world affairs.

The effect of this

transitio~

- 5 and the U. S. refP)nse to it

m~y

well he cPo.using

1~1ternal

distress in China., not to speak of consternation in the Soviet
Union, in Japan and Taiwan.
There is a. point of central aignifica.nce in these
and similar phenomena of international change.

In a massive

readjuatment, the lingering legacies of World War II are being
liquidated once and for all.

What is occurring is a series of

shifts in outlook and alignments of policy in many parts of
the world.

It is a cataclysmic process, analogous to the

geological adjustments of the earth's crust when pent-up
stresses give •<Jay along fault lines to produce a new equilibrium<
The international upheaval, like its geological counterpart,
causes sharp reverberations which are hoth wiaespread and
unsettlingo
It is &omewhat surprising that so many historic
dislocations should linger for a quarter century after the
hostilities of World War II.

In the past, mntter3 of this

- 6 kind have often been settled more promptly--as they were at
the close of World War I or as they were a century earlier
following the Napoleonic Wars.

The time lag after World War

II is ascribable, in part, to the peculiar circumstances of
peace when the guns fell silent in 1945,

What had been a

united coalition of victorious military allies, quickly split
apart into mutually distrustful armed camps organized around
antagonistic ideologies .

Hovering over this split was the

unprecedented threat cf nuclear destruction .
There are those who contend that it was the ultimate
reality of nuciear power which, alone, inhibited the post- war
antagonists from rushing into another direct and more deadly
confrontation .

Hoever that may be, the avoidance of a major

confrontation between the two ideologies seems to have been
bought, at least on our part, at the high cost of many peripheral confrontations, of

wh~ch

Viet Nam is the most recent

- 7 and, one would hope, the last .

It was hought, too, at the

price of lingering fears and suspicions about the intentions
of both sides.

In consequence, there have been massive dis -

ruptions of important domestic priorities in order to permit
a wasteful indulgence in a fierce and costly arms competition
which persists to this day.
We have, indeed, suffered what Shakespear called
"the cankers of a long peace" and can welcome in principle,
I believe, the present series of economic and political adjustments .

They do hold promise of neutralizing the unhappy

legacies of a \'lar fought t'"en'ty-five years ago.
Some of the adjustments involve the removal of
leg<~.l

straitjackets \'lhich may come to be regarded, someday,

as having been extended exerciseo in ideological rigidity
and national pride .

The long delay stems, in part, from the

fact that the United States chose to engage in the diplomacy
of non- recognition of

Soviet-~ictated

territorial changes

a~ter

- 8 the
World War II and/consequences of the Chinese Revolution.
For what seemed good and ample reasons at

t~e

time, it was

felt necessary to cling to the pre- war territorial status
quo in Europe, particularly with regard to Germany and the
pre- revolutionary political status quo with regard to China.
We are coming to realize , however, that such policies extended
indefinitely are self- defeating and contrary to our own best
interests .

ThGt is usually the case with policies based on

dead fictions as opposed to living circumstances.
While changeB in the legal perspective of our policies
are certainly of significance, they are overshadowed for the
moment by the more sweeping adjustments which seek to accommodate to contemporar y economic realities .

In general, these

adjustments reflect the fact that the United States, having
served in a variety of roles, as the world's chief hanker,
policeman, storekeeper and consumer, as well as the chief

- 9 pioneer in outer space, has now approaoued the limits of its
economic capcity and that some of the burdens have to be
redistributed.
It is notable , I believe, that the current adjust ments have concentrated on the commercial- financial elements
of our international pos ition-- to the exclusion,
of other over-extended
shortly.

ro~s

unfortur~tely,

abroad, which I shall discuss

However, I would like to take a moment to consider

at this point what has occurred under the Pnesident 1 8 new
economic program.

Essentidlly the program involves two basic

elements of our commercial-financial relationships
nations.

~ith

other

The first is accessibility to markets, that is, the

extent to which each nation opens its
products of others.

bo~ders

to the competing

The second is the method of pSlfments> or

the settling of accounts between the nations.
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In both spheres the economic power of the United
States has been preeminent for the past quarter century.
U. S. markets have absorbed vast quantities of goods from
other nations and sent abroad even greater

q~antities .

This

nation has led world policy, notably in the so-called Kennedy
round of tariff negotiations, into an era of vastly expanded
international trade through the reciprocal removal of trade
barriers .
At the same time, the U. S. has been at the core-the central banker , if you will-- of the international payments
system.

The settling of accounts between nations has been

based for a quarter of a century on the dollar and on its
convertibility into gold.

The system worked well as long as

other nations were prepared to hold dollars in their reserves
or had free access to U. S. gold.

Neither of these conditions

remains fully operative &t this time.

So a search for new

devices to facilitate financial exchange is

underw~y .

In
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recent

intern~tion~l

for the
all

r.~alignrnem;

~cknowledging

dollar.

There

conferences, there

cf v.tt.lues among the v:1-rious curr;.mcies,

a lessening of the

h~ve

h~ve b~en prnpo~~ls

also been

propos~lo

internationt;.l substitute for the dollr..r
in the international payments

of the

rel~tive v~lue

for devlning
t:~.H

the

ru1

element

centrt:~.l

~ystam .

ProposAls of this sort reflect, in my .judgment,
both e. healthy decline of othez-1:1 in their economic
on the United States a6 well

&6

d~pendency

&n uhheRlthy loss of c0nfidence

in the stability of the United States economic structure .
Cle~rly,

the "temporary" surtax

concern abroad .
exporting

n~tions

0~~·

imports c.qur;es the

dP~pest

It is &.n understandHble concern in mnjnr
as it ought to be on our part .

In my

judgment, the eurtailment of interna.tion::tl trade which is
implicit in

thi~ me~sure

is not the best

interests of the people of this
nn.tional pa.ymenta into

be'.;te~

n~tion,

balance ,

w~y,

in terms of the

to bring our interIf, fn!' no othar

reason, the new import :evy, by rB1Bing the

~rice

of f0reign

- 12 -

goods, crzates a predisposition to higher prices

f~r ~imilar

goods within the United States .
Because of

~ediate

difficulties, we should not lose

sight of the fact that the era of expanding international trade
which we have fostered for two decades may go down as one of
the truly positive advances in international relatior.s in the
20th century.

It has stimulated a highly useful economic

exchange that has strengthened the fabric of world stability.
It has served to underwrite , too, a long period of 10utual
economic well-being and cultural

e~richment.

Necessary though

they may be, the new economic policies are, at best, temporary
expedients .

Without indulging, I hope , in excessive hindsight,

I am bound to say that the adjustments might have been easier
for us and all the world , had we faced up to our predicament
at an earlier date and proceeded in a more measured way to
negotiate the necessary relief.
So far, the other principal trading nations have
eschewed acts of repr isal.
does

ex~st.

That unfortunate possibility, however;

Should there be a trade war, it would unravel the

3trands of a beneficial interdependence which have be er. woven so
carefully over the past two decades.

13
In the circumsta::ces; I endorse fully the President s
stress on the

temporary

nature of the surtax and his emphatic

opposition to a return to economic isolationism.

The possibility

of an inadvertant slide into what is eschewed) however) is not to
be overlooked.

To avoid itJ it seems to me that we must take

more fundamental steps t o redress the economic balance than a r e
contained

~n

the New Economic Policy.

We need to go beyond the

negative sanctions so far invokec and deal with what) largely)
precipitated the necessity for them 1n the first place.
This brings us to the non commercial aspects of the
nation s

~nternational

economic difficulties.

Our present

problem of balance of payments is not so much one of buying
too much and selling too l itt le of goods and serv1ces 1n inter·
national commerce. the fact in that) for years, we have sold
far more than we have bought .

Rather) the diffJculty arises)

in major part) from the spend1ng of vast amounts of public funds
1n order to maintaln an outmoded military -d1plomat1c pos1tion in

- 14 the world.

Dollars spent abroad to underwrite that posi tion

flow overseas just as surely as those which go for imports of
goods from other nations.

Dollars spent at home to backstop

that position contribute just as certainly to inflat1onary
pressures as any other non·productive expenditure in the
federal budget.
In my judgment, we are paying exorbitantly--in
billions of dollars--to sustain foreign policies and pract1ces
which are simply out of date and which have little to do with
the security and welfare of the people of the nation.
other legacies of

~orld ~ar

Like

II, these policies and practices

are in urgent need of revision.
There is no greater urgency than the liquidation of
the war 1n Viet Nam.

Ending the war is the most compelling

business of this nation.

The reason why that is so is obviously

not only a matter of cost, before all else, Viet Nam is a human
tragedy which tears at the fibers of the nation·s cohesion.

- 15 Nevertheless, Viet Nam is a root cause of the nation s present
economic difficulties.

",-/hat is involved is an astronomical levy

of government expenditure on the nation s economy in order to
finance the war, to date, something in the neighborhood of $130
billion.

This expenditure has burdened the productive economy

at home with a heavy sur charge in taxes and inflation.

Hence,

it has reduced the competitive position of the nation's commerce
in the world .
In two and a half years, it should be noted, the
President has brought about a significant reduction of the
cost of the involvement in Viet Nam .
tion has been, it is all to the good .

Prolonged as the reduc
It is to be hoped, how-

ever, that what is being attempted is not simply a gradual
tapering off of the war to a forgotten, Korean-type residue.
In Viet Nam, that would still involve, for many years, in my
judgment, continuing expenditures of billions in aid to the
Saigon government as well as U. S . forces 1n coastal enclaves
in order to shore up a regime

~n.tn

few roots in its own people.

- 16 It would be a continuation of a mistaken \'tar by other means.
It would be a way of being involved without seeming to be involved.

Even if it were possible to attain, it would be a

solution that is ill-suited to the needs of either Viet Nam
or the United States.
The Senate has tried and is now trying) again) to
establish a date certain for a total withdrawal of U.
as the policy of this nation.

s . forces

Since definite assurances do not

yet exist on this point) it can be expected that the matter will
be pressed in the Congress_ it will be pressed again and again
until the involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland ends)
lock, stock and barrel .
As in Southeast Asia) this nation ' s economy is carrying in Europe another archaic burden in the name of national
defense.

Two decades ago, the North Atlantic Treaty joined,

in a common fate with Hestern Europe) the free survival of this
nation.

Insofar as I am concerned, the North Atlantic Treaty

was valid then and remains pertinen\: to the nation ; s defense

~eeds to~~y,

1t 1 L not the trea$y of alliance

whic~

is archaic,

rather, it is the bureaucratic military structure of NATO whicn
has grown up in i t s name that stands in need of adjustment.
NATO continues to correspond,

toCay~

to circumstances

which were defined before many of you were born.

At that time

the free societies of Western Europe were heavily dependent on
the United States and
overs was great.
over staffed,

~he

In terms of today's circumstances, NATO

over-manned~

by this nation.

fear of communist totalitarian take~s

over-officered and over-financed

Of the budget of the Department of Defense,

ebout $14 billion is estimated to be traceable to NATO .

Over

a half- million American servicemen and dependents are consigned
to Europe.
That is an immense diversion of public resources.
Yet~

the basic question of NATO is not cost.

If a commitment

of that magnitude were essential for the security of the nation
nd the stability of peace, of

course~

it should be made.

More

18 to the point, however, is whether a

u.

S. deployment of that

size and composition has relevance to the situation in Europe
a quarter of a century after World Har II.

In this connection,

I returned just a month ago from a series of consultations in
seven nations in Western Europe .

The overwhelming mood of

Europe is that of detente and peace, it is not of confrontation
and war.

The emphasis is on reconciliation, it is on intra-

European trade, technological exchange, travel and other cultural
interchange.

It is not on military power or fear.

Only in NATO

are the games of war still played with any sense of expectancy
or conviction .
In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the
European nations are prepared to have us shoulder the prepon
derant costs of the organization so long as we are prepared to
do so.

They have no readiness, not to speak of eagerness, to

increase their own role or expenditures for NATO.

While they

want to maintain the North Atlantic Alliance, it is doubtful

19 that the Europeans see the need of the present force l<•vels
of NATO since they do not meet their commitmer.ts to t. em and
have not done so for many years.

It has seemed to me for a

long time that a substantial reduction in our jeployment in
Europe is possible and desirable, even as

sim~lar

steps have

already been taken by the United Kingdom, Canada and others.
Let me emphasize my belief that we do need the North
Atlantic Treaty and Alliance and we do need to preserve the
structure of NATO as an element- in-being of western defense
and unity.

But I also believe the organization can be trimmed

to a streamlined standby force without danger to our security
or the stability of peace in Europe and with great benefit to
the well-being of thJs nation.
Specifically, I have recommended that the United States
undertake a reduction of its force commitment to NATO by at
least 50 per cent, leaving no more than two U.
the European continent .

s.

divisions on

Hopefully, the Executive Branch will
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take the initiative in this connection because it can do so
without further ado.

If necessary, however, efforts to that

end will continue to be made in the Congress,

~umbcrso~e

·

though it may be to try to legislate an action of this l<ind.
It would seem to me desirable, too, that a multinational
NATO naval force should take over the Mediterranean patrol, thus
permitting a sharp reduction in the overwhelming presence of the
U.

s.

Sixth Fleet in that sea.

cuts in

u.

In the same vein, substantial

S. command participation in NATO and the designation

of a European as the next NATO commander-in-chief would serve to
reduce the presence of the United States in \•/estern Europe and,
of course, the cost which is entailed in that presence.
Changes of this kind are needed with regard to Europe
and Asia if we are to adjust our policies effectively to the
realities of the 70 1 s.

I think you will see that the changes

which I have suggested involve an end to flailing at the fears
of the past.

They have much to do with an end to . 1

,

illusions

of omnipotence and adventurism and a grea ter sharing of the

~lare
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of leadership which has focused upon this nation for too long.
They have to do, in short, with what the President, I believe,
was talking about when he introduced the ' low profile
of the Nixon Doctrine.

concept

Unless and until we make these changes,

the new economic policy will be, at best, only a stop gap for
our difficulties .
We may anticipate the most serious consequences both
at home and in our relationships abroad unless we grasp the
extent of the transition in world affairs over the past quarter
of a century.

During these years, we have come only haltingly

through successive and delayed stages of adjustment .

We are

paying now for the time gaps in our official perception and
responses to changing international realities.

We are paying

for it in the economic faltering at home and, more seriously,
in the tra3edy of Viet Nam.
"ie stand, now, on the threshhold of a new era in which
prime motivations are appearlng which are other than the fear of
aggression and war.

There may exist a possibility of breaking

22 -

down antagonisms along the gulf separating the Communist states
from those of the Western world.

Entered with a clear head and

sure foot, this era may yield the fruits of peace to nations prepared to take the risks of peace.
The promise is there. it may be that it will fall to
a younger generation to work out that promise.

I hope that your

vision of the world will be far less constrained than ours has
been for the past twenty· five years.

With luck, you may be able

to view national power not just as an instrument of territorial
defense or of the defense of ideological systems, but rather as
an element of human survival and well-being.

National resources

can then be committed in far greater degree to the fundamental
problems which know no boundaries of race or nationality:

popul<-

tion numbers, the preservation of natural resources, pollution
abatement and the enlightenment of the human spirit wherever and
however it is oppressed .
Your deliberations here can help to bring that day
closer .

I urge you to continue the quest.

